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Attorney Client Confidentiality in the
Criminal Environmental Law Context:
Blowing the Whistle on the Toxic
Client
NICHOLAS TARG*
I. Introduction
Whether an attorney should "blow the whistle" on a cli-
ent's violation of environmental law is a question that is
likely to confront attorneys with increasing frequency.'
While the regulation of pollution is not new,2 the govern-
ment's criminalization of pollution violations is a relatively
* Nicholas Targ is an attorney with the United States Department of the
Interior. Mr. Targ received Bachelor of Art degrees in Politics/Legal Studies
and Economics from the University of California at Santa Cruz and a J.D. de-
gree from the Boston College Law School.
The encouragement and advice of Elise Feldman, Kimberly Fondren and
Dr. Charles Drake greatly benefitted this article. The author is also grateful for
the many suggestions made by Paul Smyth, Timothy Elliot, Professor Richard
Huber and Professor Zygmund Plater. The views expressed, however, are those
of the author and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Interior,
any other Department or Agency of the United States, or those who reviewed
this article.
1. See Cheek Sacket, Toxic Cases Pose Difficult Ethical Issues for Lawyers,
LA. DALY J., Mar. 28, 1988, at A-1; Geoff Mann, Internal Environmental Au.
dits and Professional Privilege, 69 L. INsT. J. 1170, 1171-72 (1990).
2. Environmental laws date to the time of the ancient Greeks and possibly
before. Plato, for example, notes that
[w]attar can be tampered with in [many] ways, and the law must
accordingly come to the rescue. So we shall meet the case by enact-
ing as follows: if one man intentionally tampers with another's sup-
ply.... the injured party shall put the amount of the damage on
record, and proceed at law... ; a party convicted of poisoning wa-
ters, shall, over and above the payment of the fine imposed, under-
take the purification of the contaminated springs or reservoir ....
PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO, Law 845 (A.E. Taylor trans., J.M. Dent & Sons,
Ltd. 1st ed. 1934).
227
1
228 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
new development.3 Recognizing the impact of pollution on
human health and the environment, Congress has passed a
panoply of laws making certain unauthorized disposal4 and
emission practices,5 and the failure to keep records of hazard-
ous wastes6 felony offenses.7
Increased sanctions against polluters mark a transition
from the traditional view that environmental transgressions
are violations mala prohibitum8 to the modern view that they
can be acts of moral turpitude - mala in se.9 Indeed, in a
3. See JOSEPH F. DamNTo, ENVmONTrAL LAw AND AhmcAN Busnmss
41-47 (1986) (describing the recent criminalization of environmental violations).
Modern historical antecedents to these laws exist, however. Section 407 of the
Refuse Act of 1899, which Congress passed as part of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriations Act, made it unlawful "to throw, discharge or deposit.., from
... [a] floating craft of any kind, or from the shore ... into any navigable water
of the United States .... [except] whenever in the judgment of the Chief of
Engineers anchorage and navigation will not be injured thereby... and when-
ever any permit is so granted.... ." 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1994).
The Act further provides that dischargers emitting effluents without a permit
are "guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a
fine not exceeding $2,500 nor less than $500, or by imprisonment (in the case of
a natural person) for not less than thirty days nor more than one year, or by
both such fine and imprisonment... ." 33 U.S.C. § 411. While Congress passed
the Act to improve water transport, during the 1960s the United States Attor-
ney's Office used the Act's strict liability provision to prosecute dischargers
emitting effluents without a permit. See ZYGMUND J. B. PLATER ET AL., ENvi-
RONMENTAL LAW AND PoLicy: NATURE LAW AND SociETy 322-327 (1st ed. 1992).
4. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) §§ 1002-11012, 42
U.S.C. § 6901-6992k (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994).
5. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act [Clean Water Act] (CWA)
§§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); Clean Air Act (CAA) §§ 101-618, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
6. See supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
8. Crimes malaprohibita are "(aicts or omissions which are made criminal
by statute but which, of themselves, are not criminal." BLAces LAW DxcTIoN-
ARY 956 (6th ed. 1990). See Ilona Dotterrer, Attorney-Client Confidentiality:
The Ethics of Toxic Dumping Disclosure, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1157, 1160 (1987)
(developing the view that environmental crimes may be crimes mala in se and
therefore may be reported). See also Steven Humphreys, An Enemy of the Peo-
ple: Prosecuting the Corporate Polluter As a Common Law Criminal, 39 Am. U.
L. REv. 311, nn.10, 83-86 and accompanying text (1990) (supporting the view
that environmental crimes deserve the same punishment as traditional crimes).
9. Crimes mala in se are acts which are "[w]rongs in themselves... of-
fenses against conscience." BLAcK's LAW DICTrONARY 956 (6th ed. 1990).
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United States Department of Justice survey of 60,000 people,
environmental crimes ranked seventh in magnitude, placing
after murder, but ahead of skyjacking, armed robbery, and
bribery of public officials. 10
Despite increased penalties facing polluters, many corps-
rations continue to violate environmental laws by either fail-
ing to disclose past wrongs or by continuing to release
illegally pollutants into the environment from their facili-
ties.' A company may fear either the penalties and liabili-
ties resulting from the discovery of past violations' 2 or the
harm to its business reputation.' 3 Alternatively, a company
could make a simple business decision by balancing the cost
and risk of getting caught with the cost of compliance.' 4
With over two hundred and seventy-five million tons of
hazardous waste produced in the United States each year' 5
and the costs of disposal escalating,' 6 attorneys will increas-
ingly have to decide whether or not to report a client's envi-
10. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLErIN,
THE SEVEmTY OF CRn 2 (Jan. 1984). Additionally, state courts are, with in-
creasing frequency, returning convictions under common law criminal theories.
See Humphreys, supra note 8, nn.12-13 and accompanying text. See also Irma
S. Russell, The Role of Public Opinion, Public Interest Groups, and Political
Parties In Creating and Implementing Environmental Policy, 23 Envtl. L. Rep.
(EnvtL L. Inst.) 10665 (1993) (discussing change in public's view of the environ-
ment from that of a store of productive natural resources to an asset to be pre-
served as a non-usufruct resource). See also Colman McCarthy, The Noah
Movement, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 10, 1996, at A23 (discussing the changing
relationship of conservation and religion).
11. See infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
12. Even if releases are relatively minor the cost of remediation can bank-
rupt a small corporation. See Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, No. S-91-760
DFL/GGH (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 1993), 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20665
(1993) (finding dry cleaners liable for $3,000,000 for initial response cost and
undetermined future cost of remediation and monitoring as damages for failing
to properly dispose of cleaning agents).
13. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
14. See Dennis Epple & Michael Visscher, Environmental Pollution: Model-
ing Occurrence, Detection and Deterrence, 27 J. L. & ECON. 29, 57 (1984).
15. See U.S. ENVmoNm rAL PROTECTON AGENCY, THE HAzARDouS WASTE
SYSTEM 1-1, 1-5 (1987).
16. The cost of disposing of one cubic yard of solid hazardous waste in-
creased from $10 in 1976 to $2,500 in 1995. See Hugh J. Marbury, Hazardous
Waste Exportation: The Global Manifestation of Environmental Racism, 28
VAND. J. OF TANSN'L L. 251, text accompanying n.29 (1995).
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ronmental crimes when the client refuses to act responsibly.
The following hypothetical encapsulates the ethical dilemma
confronting an attorney when the client refuses to report an
unlawful release.
Assume Anderson, an attorney, has handled the legal af-
fairs of Cliffs dry cleaning business for several years. Re-
cently, Cliff comes to see Anderson and explains that he
discovered that the hauler hired to dispose of the company's
leftover dry cleaning chemicals has regularly dumped them
in an old gravel quarry' 7 filled with water. He says that he
does not know what to do and clearly needs legal advice.
While outside of his usual practice area, Anderson real-
izes that the dumping of hazardous materials undoubtedly
implicates environmental laws.' 8 Explaining his need to do
some preliminary research, Anderson advises Cliff to hire a
different hauler to remove any new chemical waste generated
and that he will call back with further advice. Later that
day, Anderson calls Cliff, and informs him that the dry clean-
ing company must notify state'19 and federal 2O hazardous
17. "Quarry: An open or surface working or excavation for the extraction of
building stone, ore, coal, gravel, or minerals." McGRAw-HrLu DICTIONARY OF
ScirNTwc AND TEcmncAL TERms 1621 (5th ed. 1994); "Gravel: A loose or un-
consolidated deposit of rounded pebbles, cobbles, or boulders." Id. at 870.
18. In actual practice, the attorney having handled the client's legal affairs
for many years should have been knowledgeable about the environmental laws
implicated. Dry cleaners have long been the subject of environmental scrutiny.
See Joel Makower, Dry Cleaning Draws Environmentalists' Fire, CHARLESTON
DAILY MAiL, Apr. 1, 1994, at 2D. See also Tom Matrullo, They Fear New Rules
Will Take Them to the Cleaners, NEWSDAY, Aug. 1, 1989, at 2 (discussing Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulation of dry cleaning solvent). Dry
cleaners use the EPA regulated chemical perchloroethylene (perc). Casual con-
tact with pere can cause irritation of eyes, nose and throat, dry skin, and in
concentrations about 100 parts per million, liver damage, dizziness, and loss of
balance. See id. EPA's Office of Health and Environmental Assessment, listed
the chemical as a probable human carcinogen. See Risk Assessment: Per-
chloroethylene Should be Ranked as Possible Carcinogen, SAB Says, 15 Chem.
Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 543 (July 26, 1991). But an independent study of perc con-
ducted by the Science Advisory Board found that the chemical was only a possi-
ble carcinogen. See id.
19. States retain authority to impose notification or other requirements
more stringent and not inconsistent with RCRA. See RCRA § 3009, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6929. For contrasting views regarding the success of the relationship between
federal and state government in the implementation of hazardous waste laws,
[Vol. 14
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waste authorities. He also tells him that failure to report the
dumping or failure to hire a licensed hauler could result in
criminal prosecution.21 He continues the bad news by telling
his client that the environmental authorities could hold the
dry cleaning service responsible for cleanup costs. 22
Cliff tells Anderson, his attorney, that he stopped using
the hauling service, as Anderson had counselled, but that he
would need to think about any further action. A week later,
after not hearing from his client, Anderson calls Cliff asking
how he plans to handle the problem. Cliff replies that he
"considers the problem resolved" and that he does not intend
to take further action. Anderson, again, explains the serious-
ness of the problem, but Cliff remains resolute in his inaction.
The conversation leaves Anderson in a legal and moral
quandary. In the course of his brief research, he learns that
gravel quarries frequently puncture aquifers,23 potentially al-
lowing rapid migration of hazardous substances into ground
water.24 Therefore, not only is Cliff's action illegal, the dis-
see Mark C. Schroeder et al.,ABA Standing Committee Environment Protection
Standards: Can A National Policy Be Implemented Locally, 22 EnvtL L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10001 (1992).
20. If a generator of hazardous substances discovers a release has, inter
alia, reached surface water, the generator "must immediately notify the Na-
tional Response Center (using their 24-hour toll free number 800/424-8802)."
40 C.F.R. 262.34(d)(5)(iv)(C) (1996). See also CERCLA § 103(b)(3), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9603(b)(3) (providing for criminal liability for failure to notify federal authori-
ties of a release).
21. See supra note 20. See also infra Part H.
22. A plaintiff may bring an action against owners and operators of hazard-
ous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities, and generators and trans-
porters of such materials. See CERCLA § 107 (a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
Moreover, joint and several liability applies to each of the Potentially Responsi-
ble Parties (PRPs). See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-73
(4th Cir. 1988). PRPs are liable to the government for the cost of cleaning-up
the hazardous waste site, costs borne by private individuals, and natural re-
source damages. See David A. Rich, Personal Liability for Hazardous Waste
Cleanup: An Examination of CERCLA section 107,13 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REv.
643, 653-58 (1986).
23. "Aquifer: A permeable body of rock capable of yielding quantities of
groundwater to wells and springs. A subsurface zone that yields economically
important amounts of water to wells." McGAw-HIImL DICTIONARY OF ScIaN-
TIFIC AND TEcNIcAL TEmis 120 (5th ed. 1994).
24. For example, in Johnston, Rhode Island, a waste management company
built a landfill which allegedly contaminated groundwater, causing health
5
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charge is potentially affecting nearby wells, as well as other
receptors, including humans.25
Should an attorney report a client's involvement in ille-
gal discharges of toxic material, thereby placing the company
in financial risk 26 and exposing the client to potential crimi-
nal sanctions? Could Anderson permissibly violate his cli-
ent's confidence if he thought the matter was serious enough
to merit disclosure?
This Article explores the ethics of disclosure within the
context of environmental crimes.27 Part II discusses how en-
vironmental problems are different from other regulatory is-
sues by examining the following threshold questions: (1)
what environmental laws are implicated by the client's ac-
tions, and (2) whether those actions reach criminal propor-
tion. Part III explores the general conditions under which an
attorney may breach an ethical duty of confidentiality and
the policies supporting that duty.
Part IV advocates an interpretation of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and Model Rules of Professional
problems for local residents. See Ellen Liberman, For Landfill Neighbors:
"Something's Wrong", PROVIDENCE JoumR -BLLEnN, North West Ed., Sept.
11, 1995, at 1C. See also Jack Hitt, Toxic Dreams: A California Town Finds
Meaning in an Acid Pit, 29 HARPER'S MAGAZINE July 1, 1995, at 57 (describing
the experience of the Town of Avon, California, with a hazardous waste site
located in a granite quarry); Ray Tuttle, Talks Set on Dump Cleanup, TULSA
WORLD, June 16, 1995, at B1 (discussing $12 million cleanup settlement involv-
ing hazardous waste site built in quarry which is hydrologically connected to
aquifer).
25. A receptor is a medium in which hazardous waste can accumulate (i.e.,
people using contaminated ground water, wetlands, streams, etc .... ). See, e.g.,
Timothy J. Covello, Contracting for Environmental Services, 717 Practicing L.
Inst. (Corp.) 281 (1990).
26. Several manufacturers of perchloroethylene (perc), the prinicipal chem-
ical used in dry cleaning, have filed for bankruptcy. See, e.g., Employers Ins. of
Wausa v. Duplan Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (involving insurer's
liability for injury to individuals' health and contamination of drinking wells by
manufacturer of perc which disposed excess chemicals by dumping in municipal
drain). See also Agency Request for Data Linked to Suit, 10 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) 129 (1995) (discussing suit in which court found dry cleaning chemical
distribution company liable for $1 million as a result of unintentional release).
27. This Article addresses the issue of attorney-client confidentiality only.
It does not discuss issues of attorney withdrawal or disavowal of work product
which have been the subject of recent Bar opinions.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/17
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Conduct that would permit, within certain parameters, re-
porting a client who is resolute in committing, or who actu-
ally commits, an environmental crime which would likely
seriously harm people if timely action is not taken. The Arti-
cle concludes by providing suggestions on how an attorney
should analyze the issue of disclosure and then applies this
analysis to the Anderson hypothetical.
II. Federal Environmental Statutes
Federal environmental statutes address some of the
shortcomings of the common law in maintaining the health
and safety of employees, 28 consumers, 29 and the general pub-
lic, as well as maintaining the integrity of the environment.30
While courts have applied the common law in novel ways3 ' to
address harm to human health and the environment caused
by industrial pollution, the private, fact specific, and typically
28. See Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994).
"The Act is intended to prevent the first injury which might result from unsafe
conditions and the regulations are designed to compel the maintenance of safe
working conditions, not just to assess penalties ..... " Kent Nowlin Constr. Co.
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 593 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir.
1979).
29. See, e.g., Federal Hazardous Substance Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1278
(1994) (granting concurrent jurisdiction over toxins, hazardous substances, cor-
rosives, irritants, and other chemicals to the Consumer Protection Safety Com-
mission). The Act provides the Commission with authority to issue regulations
and to initiate enforcement actions for the introduction of such chemicals into
interstate commerce in violation of law. See id. §§ 1264, 1269(a). See also Toxic
Substance Control Act (TSCA) §§ 2-412, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994) (requir-
ing chemical manufacturers to identify, test, and receive permits for the intro-
duction of certain chemical substances into the market).
30. See PLAThR Er AL., supra note 3, at 241-42.
31. See, e.g., State of New York v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d
971 (Sup. Ct., Renssaeler County 1983) (upholding common law nuisance cause
of action brought by State of New York for cleanup costs to prevent pollution of
surface and ground water, notwithstanding defendant's numerous affirmative
defenses); Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 273 (Utah 1982)
(applying strict liability to cause of action in which gravel pit used as disposal
site contaminated farmer's ground water supply) (citing Rylands v. Fletcher,
159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1865), affd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330
(1868).
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retrospective nature of tort and other common law remedies
have proved inadequate.3 2
Civil common law remedies are particularly inadequate
at addressing harm to human health caused by hazardous
wastes.3 3 As a general rule, prevention rather than redress
should be the goal in this area. But "common law remedies
may be too limited in character: they neither provide redress
for widespread public harms, nor do they provide a mecha-
nism that allows for insightful anticipatory intervention
. ... "34 Moreover, the pervasiveness of toxic agents in the
environment, 35 the latency period of their physical impact,3 6
and the concomitant difficulty in tracing their exposure
paths37 all pose evidentiary problems, making causation diffi-
cult to prove.
32. See, e.g., Boomer et al. v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871
(N.Y. 1970) (granting only a temporary injunction against operation of a cement
manufacturing facility which caused air pollution, vibrations, acid rain, and
smoke, to be vacated upon payment of permanent damages because "[a] court
should not try to [regulate] ... on its own as a by-product of private litigation
and it seems manifest that the judicial establishment is neither equipped in the
limited nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor prepared to lay down and
implement an effective policy for the elimination of air pollution").
33. "[Hlazardous waste is any solid waste designated by the EPA Adminis-
trator, based on its chemical characteristics, to be hazardous." 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.3 (1995). These compounds must be physically, chemically or biologically
treated before being discarded. See id. § 261.2(1). The EPA evaluates the
ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity and toxicity in determining the toxicity of a
compound. See id. § 261.3. Unless excluded, all wastes found to have such
characteristics are listed as "hazardous." See, e.g., id. § 261.3(a)(1) (providing
general definition of hazardous waste). See also 40 C.F.R. § 261.21-24 (defining
characteristics of ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and toxicity).
34. PLATER Er AL., supra note 3, at 241. See also H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016(W),
at 1-23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 6119, 6125 (House Committee
Report on CERCLA seeking to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act to "provide
for a national inventory of inactive hazardous waste sites and to establish a
program for appropriate environmental response" and explaining that the costs
of proper waste disposal is far less expensive than later cleanup).
35. See Carl B. Meyer, The Environmental Fate of Toxic Wastes, the Cer-
tainty of Harm, Toxic Torts, and Toxic Regulation, 19 ENVTL. L. 323, 328 (1988).
36. Hazardous wastes in sufficient quantity can cause harm in one dose
(acute toxicity), or harm may result from exposure to smaller quantities over an
extended period of time (chronic toxicity). See G. TYLER MILLER, JR., RESOURCE
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT, 237-38 (1990).
37. See Meyer, supra note 35, at 334.
[Vol. 14
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Even if damages were an appropriate remedy, the tradi-
tional common law measures of injury neither fully internal-
ize costs caused by environmental harms because of lack of
information and "large numbers" problems,38 nor do they
take into account non-economic values. This failure forces
costs to be passed on to unknowing, and presumptively un-
willing, people who may ultimately pay with their health,
property, or degradation of the publics' natural resources.
Thus, notwithstanding other problems, the common law
would fail to reduce environmental harm to an economically
efficient level.
Throughout the 1980s, the federal government enacted
or amended environmental statutes controlling hazardous
substance emissions,3 9 discharges, 40 management, 41 trans-
portation,42 storage, 43 and cleanup. 44 Additionally, Congress
expanded the array of available enforcement tools to include
criminal penalties for non-compliance. 45 These penalties are
meant, in part, to deter unlawful activity. Agencies and
courts have aggressively applied these new tools in actions
against polluters and have expanded the use of older common
law criminal provisions.46 The Environmental Protection
38. See Humphreys, supra note 8, at nn.88-109 and accompanying text (ar-
guing that common law criminal liability for injury caused through illegal re-
lease of toxic chemicals would help internalize costs now passed on to the
public). If impacts are distributed over a large number of people, high transac-
tional costs (the cost of information gathering and transfer, testing, negotiation,
litigation, etc.) will cause market inefficiency. See RoBERT COOMER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW AND ECONoMics 233-36 (1988).
39. See National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, CAA
§ 112(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d).
40. See CWA § 307(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2).
41. See TSCA § 2-412, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994); Emergency Planning
and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRTKA) §§ 301-329, 42 U.S.C.
88 11046-11050 (1994).
42. See RCRA §§ 1001-11012, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992k (1994).
43. See supra note 41.
44. See CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
45. See generally John Cooney et al., Criminal Enforcement of Environmen-
tal Laws: Part I, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtL L. Inst.) 10459 (1995) (presenting
history of federal and state law enforcement programs).
46. See generally, Humphreys, supra note 8. For example, Steven O'Neil,
president of Film Recovery Systems, Inc. and two directors, Charles Kirsch-
baum and Daniel Rodriguez, were found guilty on fourteen counts of murder
9
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Agency (EPA), for example, has recently increased 47 its crimi-
nal enforcement activity by referring 220 criminal cases to
the Department of Justice in 1994, passing the previous rec-
ord set in 1993 by thirty-six percent.48 Judges imposed
ninety-nine year jail sentences and $36,800,000 in fines for
criminal violations of environmental laws.49
A. Notification Requirements under RCRA
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)50
is the primary federal law aimed at preventing hazardous
substances from entering the environment. 51 The "cradle to
grave" documentation and monitoring of hazardous sub-
stances form a "paper trail" of the waste's movement from its
first transport to its ultimate storage or disposal.5 2 This pa-
per trail creates accountability and the potential for early de-
tection when waste is mismanaged.
Recognizing that the "disposal of wastes, especially haz-
ardous wastes, is a worsening national problem,"53 Congress
specifically provided for criminal penalties under RCRA. 54
Criminal penalties may be assessed against anyone who:
and reckless conduct for knowingly allowing employees to be exposed to lethal
does of cyanide gas. See People v. O'Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090 (IMI. App. Ct. 1990),
cert. denied, 553 N.E.2d 400 (IMI. 1990).
47. Under the Reagan administration, Federal courts convicted more than
three hundred and twenty-five individuals for violations of environmental laws
on the basis of about 450 criminal indictments. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 3,
at 334.
48. See Enforcement: Record Number of Enforcement Actions Taken in Fis-
cal 1994, EPA Says in Report, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 462 (June 23, 1995).
49. See id.
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
51. See Wn.u H. RODGERS, Euviomwr ALrr LAw 531-33 (2d ed. 1994).
52. "See Old Bridge Chems., Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't Envtl. Protection, 965
F.2d 1287, 1289 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1000 (1992). Congress
enacted RCRA to provide "nationwide protection against the dangers of im-
proper hazardous waste disposal." H.R. Rep. No. 1491, at 11 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 6238, 6249.
53. S. Rep. No. 172, at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. 5019, 5019.
54. See RCRA § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/17
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knowingly transports or causes to be transported any haz-
ardous waste identified or listed.., to a facility which does
not have a permit... ;55
knowingly omits material information or makes any false
material statement or manifest, record, report, permit, or
other document filed, or maintained, or used for purposes
of compliance with [RCRA] regulations. . . ;56
knowingly generates, stores, treats, transports, disposes
of, exports, or otherwise handles any hazardous waste...
and who knowingly destroys alters, conceals, or fails to file
any record, application, manifest, report, or other docu-
ment required to be maintained or filed for purposes of
compliance... ;57
knowingly transports without a manifest, or causes to be
transported without a manifest, any hazardous waste
.58
[or knowingly] places another in imminent danger of death
or serious bodily injury [by dumping hazardous waste]. 59
Those convicted under RCRA's criminal provisions, ex-
cept for the "knowing endangerment" provision 60 are subject
to a fine of up to $50,000 for each day of violation, imprison-
ment from two to five years, or both.61 Parties convicted of
"knowingly endangering" another, may be subject to a fine of
up to $250,000, fifteen years in jail, or both.62 Where the con-
victed party is an organization, a court may impose criminal
penalties of not more than $1,000,000. 63
Under the "knowing endangerment" provision, actual
knowledge is required.64 Under the other penalty provisions,
however, the statutory language creates some significant am-
55. RCRA § 3008(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1).
56. RCRA § 3008(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3).
57. RCRA § 3008(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(4).
58. RCRA § 3008(d)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(5).
59. RCRA § 3008(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e). This is the "kmowing endanger-
ment" provision.
60. Id
61. See RCRA § 3008(d)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(7).
62. See RCRA § 3008(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e).
63. See id.
64. See RCRA § 3008(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f)(2).
11
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biguity as to what the term "knowing" modifies. 65 Judicial
history indicates a relatively narrow application of the term
"knowing," requiring only that the responsible party knew
that he or she disposed of a waste potentially harmful to per-
sons or the environment. 66 Thus, courts have given the word
a legal gloss. 67
However, a tension exists between the general principle
that crimes require knowing conduct - mens rea68 - and the
public welfare doctrine, which is applied where conduct
threatens the public safety or welfare.69 The scienter re-
quirement, which is a prerequisite for most criminal convic-
tions, can be satisfied without a showing of actual knowledge
if the "conduct create[s] a substantial risk to the public at
large."70 Due in part to the inherent dangers associated with
mass production,7 ' the public welfare doctrine places the
The purpose of [the knowing endangerment] section is to provide
enhanced felony penalties for certain life-threatening conduct. At
the same time, the new offense is drafted in a way intended to as-
sure to the extent possible that persons are not prosecuted or con-
victed unjustly for making difficult business judgments where such
judgments are made without the necessary scienter.
... The knowledge necessary for culpability of a natural person is
actual knowledge, which may be established by direct or circum-
stantial evidence, but not constructive or vicarious knowledge.
H.R. Rep. No. 1444, at 37, reprinted in, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 5036-37.
65. See Bruce Bryan, The Battle Between Mens Rea and the Public Welfare:
"United States v. Laughlin' Finds a Middle Ground, 6 FoRDmHi ENVTL. LAW J.
157, 166 (1995) (suggesting that a court of first impression could have plausibly
interpreted the term "knowing" as modifying the phrase "treats, stores, or dis-
poses," "hazardous waste," "identified or listed," or "without a permit").
66. See, e.g., United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1091 (10th Cir. 1993) (pro-
viding an overview of circuit court decisions and analysis of the RCRA knowing
requirement in the criminal enforcement context); United States v. Hoflin, 880
F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding a jury instruction regarding the sub-
stance involved that defendant need only know that the waste "was not an in-
nocuous substance like water").
67. See Bryan, supra note 65, at 167-68.
68. See id. at nn.20-30 and accompanying text.
69. See id. at nn.31-49 and accompanying text.
70. Id. at 163.
71. See id.
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"burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent
but standing in a responsible relation to a public danger."72
The Supreme Court first applied the public welfare doc-
trine in the criminal hazardous materials context in United
States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp.73 In that
case, the Court upheld the conviction of a defendant who vio-
lated an International Commerce Commission regulation by
shipping sulfuric acid without proper labeling, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the defendant was ignorant of the require-
ment.7 4 The court reasoned that "where ... dangerous or
deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials
are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that
anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them... must
be presumed to be aware of the regulations."75 Thus, the
Court brought hazardous chemicals within the ambit of the
public welfare doctrine, but left open the defense of factual
mistake76 and the related issue of unforeseen danger 77
A majority of circuits apply the public welfare doctrine to
RCRA's "knowingly" standard.78 However, a few circuits 79
have expressed reservation as to the extent of its application
to "innocent" defendants.80 For example, the Ninth Circuit,
first explicitly adopted the public welfare doctrine in the con-
72. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (citing United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)).
73. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
74. See id. at 559.
75. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
76. See id. at 563-64. The Court explained that this defense would provide
a safe harbor for "[a] person thinking in good faith that he was shipping dis-
tilled water when in fact he was shipping some dangerous acid .... " Id.
77. Similarly, if it were not reasonably clear that the material transported
was dangerous and, thus likely to be regulated, the Court noted that the public
welfare doctrine would not apply. See id. at 564.
78. See generally, John Cooney et al., Criminal Enforcement of Environ-
mental Laws: Part H- The Knowledge Element in Environmental Crimes, 25
EnvtL L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10525 (1995) (reviewing significant decisions in-
terpreting environmental statutes' mens rea requirement).
79. The Ninth Circuit, see, e.g., United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795 (9th
Cir. 1992), and the Third Circuit, see, e.g., United States v. Johnson & Towers,
Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, sub nom. Angel v. United States,
469 U.S. 1208 (1985), have narrowed the application of the public welfare doc-
trine in the RCRA context.
80. See Speach, 968 F.2d at 796.
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text of RCRA,81 but then limited its application.82 In United
States v. Hoflin,83 a municipality's director of public works in-
structed an employee to bury drums of excess paint in the
city's unpermitted waste facility. Affirming the director's
conviction,84 the Ninth Circuit found that the policies under-
lying RCRA "like those of the Food and Drug Act, '... touch
phases of the lives and health of people, which in the circum-
stances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-pro-
tection.'"85 Thus, while the director did not cause the waste
to be disposed with knowledge of the site's unsuitability, the
pernicious nature of the chemicals and the public's lack of in-
formation caused the court to impute criminal intent.86
However, the Ninth Circuit later declined to remove the
scienter requirement in circumstances where a defendant
was ignorant of a third party's permit status. In United
States v. Speach,8 7 the court reversed the conviction of a
transporter who delivered hazardous waste to a storage facil-
ity which did not have the required permit.88 Without citing
the public welfare doctrine, the divided panel distinguished
the facts presented from those in Hoflin.89 Significantly, the
majority found that whereas, in Hoflin, the permittee was
also the defendant and "was in the best position to know that
the facility lacked a permit,"9 0 in Speach, the defendant did
not operate the facility and, therefore, should not be required
to know the permit status of another's facility.9 '
81. See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
82. See Speach, 968 F.2d at 797.
83. 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
84. See id at 1040.
85. Id. at 1038 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280
(1943)).
86. See 880 F.2d at 1034. See also supra notes 34-37 and accompanying
text.
87. 968 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1992).
88. See id. at 797.
89. See id
90. See id.
91. See 68 F.2d at 797.
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While a few courts have followed Speach,92 the reach of
the decision is in question. Indeed, a year after deciding
Speach, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Weitzenhoff,9 3
qualified the holding, stating that "Speach recognizes the
general rule that public welfare offenses are not to be con-
strued to require proof that the defendant knew that he was
violating the law... and finds only a narrow exception...."94
While Weitzenhoff narrows, or clarifies, Speach, this "narrow
exception" could provide sufficient room for a court to require
the showing of mens rea to protect "innocent" defendants.
B. Notification under the CERCLA
While RCRA is prospective and preventative 95 in its ap-
proach to toxic substance control, the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) is retrospective and remedial.96 For example, the
counterpart of the reporting and manifest system under
RCRA is CERCLA's Section 103.97 This section requires noti-
fication by both the facility and the "person(s) in charge"98
when hazardous substances have been released. 99 Courts
92. See, e.g., United States v. Heuer, 4 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 1993).
93. 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993).
94. Id. at 1284 n.5.
95. See Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n,
66 F.3d 667, 678-79 (4th Cir. 1995).
96. See id. at 679.
97. CERCLA § 103(c) provides:
any person who owns or operates or who at the time of disposal
owned or operated, or who accepted hazardous substances for
transport and selected, a facility at which hazardous substances ...
are or have been stored, treated or disposed of shal... notify the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency of the exist-
ence .... Any person who knowingly fails to notify the Administra-
tor of the existence of any such facility shall, upon conviction, be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than one
year, or both.
42 U.S.C. § 9603(c) (emphasis added).
98. CERCLA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a). Based on a fifty state search in
the Lexis database, no corporate counsel has been found to be the "person in
charge." The search, "hazardous waste and person in charge w/20 attorney or
lawyer or counsel," in the states/courts and genfed/courts databases produced
no relevant cases.
99. See CERCLA § 103(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c).
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have interpreted CERCLA as a public health and welfare
statute, 00 reading its provisions so as to give effect to its pur-
pose.' 0 ' Analogous to RCRA, section 103 of CERCLA does
not require the defendant to know that a release violated the
law.10 2 Rather, the statute "demands only that the defendant
be aware of his acts." 0 3
Because Congress sought to commence cleanup of haz-
ardous waste quickly, CERCLA places an affirmative and
continuing duty on responsible persons to report unauthor-
ized releases as a "preventative" measure.' 0 4 As with RCRA,
the government may levy criminal penalties for failing to re-
port releases.' 0 5
The sentencing action in United States v. Liebmanl0 6 is
instructive as to the importance of keeping accurate records.
In that case, a small mill owner pled guilty to violating a
criminal enforcement provision under CERCLA,107 and was
sentenced to serve time in prison for failing to notify authori-
ties of asbestos released into the environment. 10 8 The judge
based the mill owner's sentence, in part, on the owner's fail-
ure to keep accurate records of the discharge in an effort to
conceal the environmental offense. 10 9
Specifically, the judge made the following finding of facts:
while preparing to sell his business, the owner of the mill had
100. See, e.g., United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961, 966 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, sub nom. Goldman v. United States, 14 S.Ct. 1649 (1994).
101. See id. at 996 (recognizing the importance of CERCLA's reporting re-
quirement to allow the government to "move quickly to check the spread of a
hazardous release") (quoting United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d
Cir. 1989)).
102. See id. at 966-67.
103. Id. at 967. Similarly, nonfeasance will not exculpate a defendant, if "the
government [can] establish (the person's] knowledge by showing that [the per-
son] closed his eyes to obvious facts or failed to investigate when aware of facts
which demand investigation." United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 88 (6th
Cir. 1991).
104. See CERCLA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a).
105. See Roger Colton et al., Seven-Cum-Eleven: Rolling the Toxic Dice in
the U.S. Supreme Court, 14 B.C. ENv. AFF. L. REv. 345, 374 (1987).
106. 40 F.3d 544 (2d Cir. 1994).
107. See id. at 547.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 551-52.
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an environmental audit conducted on his property.11o The
audit showed the presence of asbestos, a listed material,"1
surrounding the mill's boiler room.112 The owner contracted
with a salvager to remove the boiler, who in turn hired em-
ployees to remove the asbestos."13 None of the participants in
the asbestos removal were certified to handle hazardous
waste.114 Instead of properly disposing of the asbestos, the
toxic material was dumped into a gravel pit in nearby
woods. 1 5 While the owner did not initially know that asbes-
tos was being removed, he later dismissed the contractor and
supervised the job himself.116 The court found that the owner
"had to know that something highly improper was going on
and he should have stopped it.""17
The owner contended that because he had pled guilty
only to a record-keeping offense, several sentencing level en-
hancements pertaining to substantive offenses under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines were inappropriately
considered.118
The court rejected the owner's argument on two grounds.
First, the court found that while the failure to report did not
cause the release, "the recordkeeping offense ... should be
regarded as conduct relevant thereto...,-11 9 because the re-
porting violations overlapped with the ongoing release.
Second, relating to a challenge to the application of a spe-
cific sentencing guideline, the court determined the provision
unambiguously related recordkeeping to the substantive
crime, stating that "[ilf a recordkeeping offense reflected an
effort to conceal a substantive environmental offense, [the
court must] use the offense level for the substantive of-
110. See id. at 546.
111. 40 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1995).
112. See Liebman, 40 F.3d at 546-47.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 547.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. 40 F.3d at 547.
118. See id. at 551.
119. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUMELINES, § 1B1.3(a)(1) (1995)).
17
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fense."' 20 Thus, the court recognized the centrality of CER-
CLA's reporting requirements, while simultaneously
considering the defendant's state of mind when failing to
report.
To summarize, RCRA creates duties to treat, store, and
transport hazardous substances in accordance with both fed-
eral and state laws,121 and CERCLA creates duties to re-
port122 and cleanup past releases. 23 Because the laws
pertain to harmful substances which are difficult to detect
and protect against, the element of knowledge is imputed in
most cases to anyone who knowingly handles or possesses
them.' 24 Legislative history, court interpretation and sen-
tencing strongly suggest that improper recordkeeping or dis-
posal of hazardous substances can be mala in se, as well as an
ordinary breach of government regulation - mala
prohibitum.'25
III. The Ethical Duty to Maintain Client Confidences
An attorney must not reveal information that would em-
barrass a client or adversely impact the client's interests,
with limited exceptions. 26 This duty has been characterized
120. Liebman, 40 F.3d at 552 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUMELMES
§ 2Q1.2(b)(5)).
121. See RCRA § 3005, 42 U.S.C. § 6925.
122. See CERCLA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 9603.
123. See CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
124. See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S.
558, 565 (1971) (holding that defendants possessing dangerous substances must
be presumed to know that such harmful materials are subject to regulation).
See also United States v. Self, 2 F.3d at 1071, 1091 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
that because RCRA is a public welfare statute designed to protect human
health, defendant's ignorance of the law is not a defense to criminal prosecu-
tion). For a thorough discussion of the scienter requirements under the crimi-
nal provisions of RCRA and CERCLA, see Lisa Ann Harig, Ignorance is not
Bliss: Responsible Corporate Officers Convicted of Environmental Crimes and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 DUKE L.J. 145 (1992).
125. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
126. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmILrrY Disciplinary Rule
[DR] 4-101 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]; MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDucT Rule 1.6 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RuLEs].
Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client...
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not
knowingly:
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as the "glory of our profession,"127 and the "cornerstone of the
adversarial system and effective assistance of counsel."128
The Bar subjects an attorney who improperly violates the
tenet of confidentiality to expulsion or other discipline.129
An attorney's duty of silence sometimes creates demand-
ing and entangled allegiances among the confider, the attor-
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage
of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of
himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after
full disclosure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or cli-
ents affected, but only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary
Rules or required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the infor-
mation necessary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his
fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates
against an accusation of wrongful conduct ....
MODEL CODE DR 4-101
Confidentiality of Information.
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation
of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client form committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a con-
troversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to
a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon con-
duct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in
any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
MODEL Ruins Rule 1.6.
127. United States v. Costen, 38 F. 24 (C.C.D. Colo. 1899) (Brewer, J.).
128. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 n.4 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(quoting Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1981)).
129. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 8.4; MODEL CODE DR 4-101.
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate
the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so,
or do so through the acts of another." MODEL RULES Rule 8.4(a).
19
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ney's own conscience and legal obligations, and society. 130 In
general, we base a moral duty not to betray confidences on
four premises. 13 1 First, we recognize an individual's right to
privacy and a right to make plans away from the glare of pub-
lic inspection.13 2 This most basic axiom forms our concept of
individual autonomy. 133 Second, we generally accept an indi-
vidual's right to share plans with other people out of respect
for the intimates' need to plan for their collective and individ-
ual well-being, and to prevent the harm disclosure would
cause. 34 Third, this general rule of preserving confidences is
given weight and special meaning by the implicit or explicit
pledge of allegiance given to the confider, and the confidant's
promise to protect the secret. 35
The fourth and final premise specifically addresses the
professional's duty of confidentiality to the client. 36 "This
premise assigns weight beyond ordinary loyalty to profes-
sional confidentiality, because of its utility to persons and to
society."137 A client will more likely seek assistance knowing
that the attorney will not betray confidences.138 Society ben-
efits when an attorney counsels and encourages the legally
troubled person to conform to legal standards of conduct.' 39
The individual also gains by being able to act autonomously,
130. For representative contrasting arguments on this issue compare Rich-
ard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuMIN
RIGHTS 1 (1975) with Monroe Freedman Professional Responsibility of the Crim-
inal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MicH. L. REV. 1469
(1966).
131. See SlssELA Box, SECRETS: ON THE ETmcs OF CONCEALMENT AND REVE.
LATION 119-121 (1982) [hereinafter Boa, SECRETS]. Bok's insights form the four
premises which follow.
132. See id. at 120.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 120-21.
136. See Box, SECRETS, supra note 131, at 121-23.
137. Id. at 122.
138. See id.
139. "[P]reserving client confidences ordinarily serves the public interest be-
cause people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal
obligations, when they know their communications will be private." MODEL
RuLEs Preamble.
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with the full benefit of knowing legal consequences of plans,
when the attorney keeps secrets.140
The presumption that an attorney should maintain confi-
dences is heavy, based on either the societal or individual
benefits flowing from the preservation of secrets. 14 ' The
scope of the attorney's ethical duty, however, remains the
subject of much debate,142 and depends, in part, on whether
the attorney practices in a jurisdiction governed by the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct or the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility.143
A. Approaches to Disclosure
There are two approaches that states have adopted in an-
alyzing an attorney's duty to disclose a client's confidences:
the "broad view" under the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct (Model Rules) and the narrow view under the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code).' 44 The
Model Rules have been adopted by New Jersey, Connecticut,
140. See Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Difference, A
Problem, And Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. BAR. FoUND. REs. J. 617 (1986)
(noting that an attorney's amoral ethical role is premised on an individual's
autonomy, equality and diversity).
141. Professor Wasserstrom advances an alternate position that a attorney
should actively consult and act upon her own feelings about the desirability of
the clients action. See Wasserstrom, supra note 130, at 6.
142. Compare Pepper, supra note 140 with David Luban, The Lysistratian
Prerogative A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 A1. B. FouND. tEs. J. 637
(1986).
143. See supra note 126.
144. The distinction between the broad and narrow view of disclosure in the
environmental crimes context is based on the analysis by lona Dotterrer. See
Dotterrer, supra note 8.
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Pennsylvania and forty other states.145 However, New York
and nine other states have not adopted the Model Rules. 146
The American Bar Association's Model Rule 1.6 permits
an attorney to disclose confidential information only "to pre-
vent the client from committing a criminal act that the law-
yer believes is likely to result in imminent death or serious
bodily harm."' 47 This broad view of confidentiality 48 empha-
sizes the need for the client to feel secure knowing that her
attorney will not disclose information simply because the at-
torney finds the client's choices objectionable. 149 Without
this security, lay people would be beholden to an oligarchy of
experts who understand the law and dispense their knowl-
edge only when the client's cause comports with their particu-
lar sense of morality.150 As a consequence, proponents of the
broad view of confidentiality argue that a narrower disclosure
rule would limit individual autonomy and that clients would
145. While few states have adopted the Model Rules in whole, as of Decem-
ber 15, 1993, attorneys must conform their professional conduct to standards
based on the Model Rules in the following states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia
Islands, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. List compiled by
American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility.
146. New York and a handful of other jurisdictions, including Massachu-
setts, Ohio, Vermont, and Virginia, still use the Model Code. See Frank 0.
Bowman, III, A Bludgeon by any Other Name: The Misuse of "Ethical Rules"
Against Prosecutors to Control the Law of the State, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs
665, n.502 (1996).
147. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6. Model Rule 1.6 also provides for revelation to
"establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense . .. based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding
concerning the lawyer's representation of the client." MODEL RULES Rule
1.6(b)(2). Thus, while a strict statutory construction would apply the "immi-
nent" requirement only to "death," because of the use of the disjunctive "or",
such a reading would not make sense in context and would largely eviscerate
the limiting impact of the rule.
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149. See Pepper, supra note 140, at 625-35.
150. See id. at 626.
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not seek the legal assistance they need, creating a social
liability.' 5 '
The narrow view of confidentiality caters more to the at-
torney's sense of morality and to the costs to society that may
arise from the non-disclosure. 52 Contrasting with the Model
Rules, Model Code Disciplinary Rule 4-101 permits disclosure
to prevent a crime even if it will not result in "imminent
death or serious bodily harm."153 Under the Model Code, an
attorney "may reveal [tihe intention of his client to commit a
crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."154
Thus, attorneys practicing in New York, Massachusetts, and
a minority of other states' 55 may, in determining whether to
disclose a client's confidence, balance the values of: preserv-
ing confidentiality against the severity of the crime; the attor-
ney's feelings on the morality of the client's plans; and the
benefits of preventing the intended crime or mitigating the
consequent harm.
B. Continuing Harms and Crimes
An attorney may not report wholly past crimes under
either the Model Rules or the more permissive Model Code. 15 6
The Model Rules and Model Code, however, treat continuing
crimes and crimes with continuing consequences with less
clarity. Several authorities have interpreted the ethical duty
of confidentiality as proscribing disclosure in such cases. 5 7
Professor Abramovsky, for example, advocates an inclusive
151. See id. at 634.
152. Professor Bok would likely find the 'broad" view overly restrictive:
"There is much truth in saying that one is responsible for what happens after
one has done something wrong or questionable. But it is a very narrow view of
responsibility which does not also take some blame for a disaster one could eas-
ily have averted, no matter how much others are also to blame." SiSSELA BOK,
LYING: MORAL CHOICES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 41-42 (1978).
153. MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(b)(1). See supra note 126.
154. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(3). See supra note 126.
155. See supra note 146.
156. See Bruce A. Boyer, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Parents in
Child Welfare Cases, 64 FoRDHA~A L. REV. 1621, 1633 n.50 (1996).
157. See Timothy J. Miller, Attorney's Duty to Reveal Future Criminal Con-
duct, 1984 DUKE L. J. 582, 586-589 (1984); Abraham Abrarnovsky, A Case for
Increased Confidentiality, 13 FORDHArMi URB. L. J., 11, 17-18 (1985).
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definition that anchors the present or future harm to the past
crime. He reasons that "disclosure of continuing crimes
would necessitate disclosure of the past crime, which is pro-
hibited ... 1 58 The corollary argument, that disclosure
would chill client trust in attorneys, adds weight to the other-
wise largely technical analysis.
Several courts have expressed support for this inclusive
definition of past crime in the context of a client's present
fraudulent action. In Schatz v. Rosenberg,159 the Fourth Cir-
cuit rejected a third party's claim that an attorney should
have warned him of a client's fraud. Finding that the attor-
ney owed no duty to the injured third party, the court held
that any alternative finding would create "an incentive [for
attorneys] not to press [their] clients for information [and] at-
torneys would more often be unwitting accomplices to the
fraud as a result of being kept in the dark by their clients
.... "160 While the Schatz opinion stands for the proposition
that no duty exists to disclose past crimes with ongoing conse-
quences in the fraud context, the Court's reasoning that "the
client is more likely to disclose damaging or problematic in-
formation, and the [attorney] will more likely to be able to
counsel his client against misconduct"16' when the attorney
maintains secrets, supports a general proscription against re-
porting ongoing crimes.
On the other hand, Bar opinions have found that an at-
torney may disclose certain information related to criminal
activity if that activity is present or ongoing.' 62 For example,
ABA Opinion 1470 states "the lawyer has a duty to inquire
further into the circumstances surrounding the [client's con-
duct] in order to prepare properly and to avoid aiding the cli-
ent in perpetrating further fraudulent or criminal
conduct." 6 3 Further, "the lawyer still must be assured that
158. Abramovsky, supra note 157, at 18.
159. 943 F.2d 485, 490 (4th Cir. 1991).
160. Id at 493.
161. Id.
162. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1470 at 396 (1981).
163. Id. at 395.
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the requested services will not be predicated upon the client's
past fraud or other criminal conduct."164
Additionally, a number of ethics panels have concluded
that a fugitive commits a crime in the past, present, and fu-
ture by failing to turn herself in, by remaining a fugitive, and
by making clear that she intends not to surrender in the
future.165
Similarly, a narrow definition of past crime is used in the
context of child abuse. 166 The Indianapolis Ethics Commit-
tee1 67 held that an attorney may, but is not required to, com-
ply with a state law compelling "any individual who has
reason to believe that a child is a victim of child abuse" to
notify proper authorities. 168 The Ethics Committee's position
is supported by the unusual nature of the crime, 6 9 the vic-
tim,170 and the unusually harmful impact.
Child abuse is shocking to the senses - mala in se. The
abused child, however, is unlikely to report the perpetrator's
actions because of the psychological impact of the harm' 71
164. Id. See also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, For-
mal Op. 93-375 (1993) (discussing an attorney's obligation to disclose informa-
tion adverse to his client).
165. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. While the case of the fugi-
tive appears settled, Monroe Freedman continues to enunciate his strong belief
in the sanctity and preservation of confidentiality in the context of the fugitive
client. See Monroe Freedman, When Keeping Secrets Becomes A Crime, LEGAL
Tims, Jan. 14, 1991, at 20.
166. See Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously Beyond Positivist Juris-
prudence In Legal Ethics, 80 IowA L. REv. 901, 905 (1995).
167. See Bruce A. Boyer, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Parents in
Child Welfare Cases, 64 FoRDHAh L. Ruv. 1621, 1624 n.57 (1996) (citing Indian-
apolis Bar Ass'n, Legal Ethics Comm. Op. 1986-1 (1986)).
168. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-3 (Michie 1987). As of November 1992,
twenty-two states required individuals, including attorneys, to report cases of
child abuse to state authorities. See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting
Laws, 42 DuxE L. J. 203, 217 (1992). Four of these laws explicitly require attor-
neys to disclose a client's abusive behavior to authorities. See id.
169. See infra note 171 and 175 and accompanying text.
170. See infra note 171-73 and accompanying text.
171. See John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 240 Cal. Rptr. 319,323 (Ct.
App., 1st Dist. 1987) (noting expert witnesses testimony on "child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome," wherein child delays disclosure because of fear par-
ent will not be able to protect him or her).
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and the fear of retaliation from the abuser or others. 172
Therefore, just as the fugitive is unlikely to reveal her where-
abouts voluntarily, it is unlikely that the child abuser's harm-
ful actions will end unless there is outside intervention.
Child abuse is unusual in at least one other respect that
points towards disclosure: many perpetrators tend to be ha-
bitual in their conduct. 173 If the attorney has reason to be-
lieve that the conduct has occurred once, there is reason to
believe it will happen again. 74 Although the crime occurred
in the past and that crime may coincide with the harm, the
past abuse foreshadows the potential for further abuse, con-
tinuation, and aggravation of the harm.
While continuing harm issues tend to be complicated and
context specific, some trends can be traced. First, if the crime
is mala in se, and the harm(s) is separated in time from the
client's act, the attorney may report.175 Professor Kaufman
gives the example of a client who discloses that he has laced
pain killers with cyanide and places it in harm's way, as the
type of conduct which an attorney may report.176
Second, if the crime is continuing or repetitive in nature,
as in the case of a fugitive who refuses to surrender or a child
subject to habitual abuse, the attorney may disclose the
crime.177
172. See, eg., id at 321, 325-26 (applying delayed discovery rule because
teacher, perpetrator, was "able to achieve concealment of the sexual assault
upon the minor student through abuse of the teacher's authority over the
minor").
173. Professor Mosteller notes, for example, that where abuse is of a sexual
nature the perpetrator is likely to act again. See Mosteller, supra note 168, at
nn.143-47 and accompanying text.
174. See id.
175. Indeed, this may be the critical issue. While an attorney may be re-
quired to hold the knowledge of a client's fraudulent criminal activities invio-
late, such crimes typically do not reach a level of severity that shock the moral
senses, and are therefore less severe, crimes mala prohibitia.
176. See ANDREw L. KAUFmN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBILIrY
214, 219-21 (3d ed. 1989).
177. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
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Third, if disclosure of the future harm or crime also re-
quires revelation of a past crime, the attorney must evaluate
any disclosure with special caution.1 7s
Fourth, if the attorney can mitigate or prevent the harm
through disclosure and cessation of the crime or harm is
otherwise unlikely because of the nature of the crime or na-
ture of the victim, the attorney may contemplate disclosure.
Together, these general rules stand for the principle that
if the client's act, or potential act, causes, or will likely cause,
a person serious harm in the future and the act cannot read-
fly be characterized as a single or one-time event, the attor-
ney may break the client's confidence. 179 From a policy
standpoint the opinions and cases make sense. As a whole,
they suggest the intuitive principle that when the harm
caused by the client is both unconscionable and preventable,
the attorney may take steps to prevent injury from occurring.
Because the particular injury occurs in a fact specific context,
the attorney, depending on the ethical guidelines of the juris-
diction, may balance the benefits of preventing the injury
against the harm of disclosure to the client, society, and the
profession, and use her judgment to make a decision whether
to disclose.
IV. Is Disclosure an Option?
The rules regarding the disclosure of client confidences
are further complicated when the client is an organization.
Under the Model Rules, "[a] lawyer employed or retained by
an organization represents the organization acting through
its duly authorized constituents."180 Ordinarily, the attorney
178. See supra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
179. A client's violent act, permanently maiming a person for example,
causes ongoing harm to the victim. The attorney, however, could not report the
client's action. While the impact on the victim's well being is ongoing, the harm
is not preventable. The victim is not going to get better if the attorney were to
report, and the harm is readily attributable to a single event. This example
contrasts with the client who discloses that he or she has replaced aspirin with
cyanide pills in stores.
180. MODEL RULES Rule 1.13(a). Similarly, the Code's ethical considerations
provide that the attorney of a "corporate client owes allegiance to the corpora-
tion... [and] should hold paramount its interests." MODEL CODE EC 5-18.
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should rely on the judgment of these "constituents" in the for-
mulation and implementation of business decisions.""' If the
attorney finds the firm's choices lawful but repugnant or im-
prudent the attorney may ordinarily withdraw.'8 2 However,
if the attorney wishes to keep the corporate client, when "an
officer [or] employee [violates] a legal obligation to the organi-
zation [or violates] a law which reasonably might be imputed
to the organization," the attorney must take steps to prevent
injury to the company.'8 3
Under both the Model Rules and the Model Code, the at-
torney must bring the contemplated or executed illegal action
or omission to the attention of the firm's constituents and re-
monstrate against the action or non-action. "But there comes
a point at which a reasonable attorney must conclude that his
advice is not being followed .... At this critical juncture,...
[t]he lawyer is in the best position to choose his next step." 84
When the corporate client, like Cliffs dry cleaning busi-
ness, intends to dispose illegally hazardous substances or re-
fuses to take corrective action after the fact, the attorney
faces a difficult dilemma. On one hand, the unusual nature of
hazardous waste carries with it the threat of pervasive, and
potentially devastating, effects to human health and the envi-
181. MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.13 cmt.4.
182. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.16(b)(3); MODEL CODE DR 2-110(C)(1)(d). '[A]
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client... if... a client insists upon
pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent."
MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.16(b)(3).
"(A] lawyer may not.., withdraw... unless... withdrawal is because... [hlis
client. . . renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out his em-
ployment effectively." MODEL CODE DR 2-110(C)(1)(d)
183. MODEL RULES Rule 1.13(b). When an attorney learns of a violation of
law "his continued participation violates professional standards unless he takes
prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance." Checkosky v. Securities & Ex-
change Comm'n, 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Carter 1981 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,167 (Feb. 28, 1981)).
184. In re Carter, 1981 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 84,172. The Model Rules provide
similar advice: Where the attorney finds his advice is being ignored, "it may be
reasonably necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed
by a higher authority in the organization.... At some point it may be useful or
essential to obtain an independent of legal opinion." MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.13
cmt. 4.
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ronment.185 Moreover, the long latency period 8 6 and adverse
affects associated with improper disposal of hazardous sub-
stances, as well as the unlikelihood of reporting by employ-
ees, 87 impede early detection and prevention of harm.
On the other hand, if the attorney makes disclosure, the
polluting corporation's fisc will almost certainly suffer due to
the cost of cleanup, 8 8 and from the loss of goodwill and possi-
ble penalties.' 8 9 Further, from a broader professional per-
spective, if corporations perceive a threat of attorney
disclosure, many companies may simply cease discussing
their serious environmental problems with their attorneys,
thus limiting the chance that corrective action will be taken.
Regardless of the attorney's ultimate action, the public, the
corporation, and the legal profession may all be threatened in
some way. The issues facing an attorney contemplating dis-
closure under either RCRA or CERCLA are substantially dis-
similar, therefore, each must be analyzed separately.
A. Reporting under RCRA
1. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
The Model Code permits an attorney broad latitude in
deciding whether to disclose a client's confidence. If the client
acts or makes clear that he or she will act in a criminal man-
ner, the attorney may disclose. 19° Therefore, if Anderson, the
attorney in the hypothetical, practices in a jurisdiction gov-
erned by the Model Code, he may disclose Cliffs illegal dispo-
sal of hazardous waste. Having explained the seriousness of
the dry cleaning service's violation, and remonstrated against
185. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
187. See BoK, SECRTS, supra note 131, at 210-13.
188. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Even if a parcel of land is
proximate to a release, or the public merely perceives the to be affected, the
threat of liability can place a financial cloud over the company. See Andrew N.
Davis & Santo Longo, Stigma Damages in Environmental Cases: Developing
Issues and Implications for Industrial and Commercial Real Estate Transac-
tions, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10345 (July 1995).
189. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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nonreporting, and given Cliffs unwillingness to comply, the
path of disclosure is available to Anderson.
The discretion afforded an attorney under the Model
Code demands that the attorney apply her own judgment in
determining whether to break a client's confidence once the
client has made clear that she will engage in criminal con-
duct.191 In making that difficult determination, the attorney
should consider the effect of disclosure on all parties im-
pacted by her decision: the client, the public, and the profes-
sion. Among other factors, the attorney ought to evaluate:
(1) the client's resolve to illegally dispose of the hazardous
waste; (2) likelihood that the client will not dump if prior no-
tification is given; (3) the potential harm to society or individ-
ual people if the dumping does occur; (4) the potential
damage to the client by breaking the confidence; and (5) the
spill-over effect that notification may have on the attorney-
client relationship relating to future dealings with the client
at issue and other clients, generally.
2. The Model Rules and the Special Problem of
"Imminence"
The Model Rules' more limited exception to the prohibi-
tion on disclosure proscribes revelation except when the cli-
ent's action is likely to "result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm .. .."19 Because adverse effects of
exposure to hazardous substances may take years to de-
velop,' 93 the "imminency" requirement, at first blush, is
troubling.194 It is especially problematic because, without
early warning, the exposed person(s) can take no protective
action.
191. See supra note 126.
192. MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6.
193. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
194. "Imminent" means "(n]ear at hand; mediate rather than immediate;
close rather than touching; impending; on the point of happening; threatening;
menacing; perilous. Something which is threatening to happen at once, some-
thing close at hand, something to happen upon the instant, close although not
yet touching and on the point of happening." BLAcKes LAW DiCTIONARY 750 (6th
ed. 1990).
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Several courts have recognized this timing disconnect of
cause and effect in the hazardous substance context, and re-
solved it by broadening the ordinary meaning of "imminence"
to meet the needs of toxic substance exigencies.' 95 In Village
of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc.,196 the Supreme Court of
Illinois granted injunctive relief to a municipality which had
petitioned to close a hazardous waste disposal facility built on
top of an abandoned mine 9 7 where the ground was subject to
subsidence. The operators argued that, because the facility
had caused no serious problems in its four years of operation,
the court must find "a 'dangerous probability' that the
threatened or potential injury will occur," and assess the like-
lihood of that harm occurring. 98
Agreeing with the defendant's statement of the law, 199
the court found that the plaintiff could meet the burden of
proof by showing that waste disposal at the site would result
in substantial injury when exposure occurs, and that expo-
sure is, in fact, likely to occur.200 Describing the operation of
a hazardous waste site in an unsuitable location as "seriously
and imminently pos[ing] a threat to the public health,"20 ' the
court enjoined the facility from further operation and ordered
restoration of the site. Thus, recognizing that the threat of
occurrence leading to exposure is unpredictable in the short-
run, but almost certain over the long-run, the Wilsonville
court impliedly related the imminency requirement to the
195. Considering the meaning of "imminence" in RCRA's "imminent and
substantial endangerment provision," RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B), which provides for the availability of injunctive relief, courts
have consistently interpreted the term broadly. See Dague v. City of Burling-
ton, 935 F.2d 1343, 1356 (2d Cir. 1991); Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, No.
S-91-760 DFLGGH (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 1993), 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20665, 20671 (1993) (analyzing whether a dry cleaner's handling of hazardous
waste posed an imminent threat and holding that 'imminence' does not require
a showing that actual harm will occur immediately so long as the risk of
threatened harm is present").
196. 426 N.E.2d 824, 836-37 (IMI. 1981).
197. See id. at 841.
198. Id. at 836 (quoting RESTATEENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 933(1), cmt. b
(1979)).
199. See id.
200. See id. at 837.
201. Wilsonville, 426 N.E.2d at 838 (emphasis added).
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likelihood of injury upon release, rather than to the temporal
proximity of actual release.
Similarly, the better view of the "imminence" require-
ment under the Model Rules would permit disclosure of (1)
crimes committed by a client, (2) that are likely to cause
harm, (3) of a serious nature, (4) to a person, and (5) that the
harm is in fact likely to occur. 20 2 Under this view of the im-
minence requirement, the attorney could balance the compet-
ing factors discussed above203 in determining whether to
disclose when she is confident that the crime will likely cause
serious bodily harm.
The position advanced here is analogous to that accepted
in the child abuse context, 20 4 and parallels Kaufman's exam-
ple of the client who laces pain killers with cyanide. 20 5 From
a practical standpoint, in many cases of unlawful hazardous
waste disposal, the threatened harm will almost certainly oc-
cur without notification. Because of the difficulty in discover-
ing releases 206 and the unlikelihood of reporting,20 7 in order
for the imminence requirement to make sense, the require-
ment must relate to the likelihood that the harm will occur
rather than the immediacy of the harm.
3. Criminal Liability for Failure to Report Past
Dumping
Failure to report past dumping is a criminally sanction-
able offense under RCRA.2 0 8 RCRA's reporting provisions
202. A policy rationale for a contrary reading would be very troubling. For
example, if a client were to announce to his or her attorney that he or she in-
tended to kill a person over time by replacing salt with arsenic, the narrow
reading would disallow disclosure. Because people can absorb a threshold
amount of the toxic element before suddenly dying, it is difficult to know when,
if ever, the narrow view would allow revelation under such circumstances.
While the attorney in the hypothetical case might dissuade the client from con-
tinuing the plot, the client's potential change of mind does not seem like a com-
pelling reason to risk the victim's life.
203. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
208. See RCRA § 3008(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(4).
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makes clear that Congress intended the manifest system to
track waste.20 9 Failure to notify appropriate state and fed-
eral authorities frustrates the statute's objective - the safe
disposal of toxic waste.2 1o Without prompt notification, the
probability of harm grows while the opportunity to prevent or
to mitigate the harm diminishes. Thus, strong policy argu-
ments favor the view that a company's failure to disclose toxic
substance release constitutes a crime in the present and fu-
ture, as well as in the past.
Congress, however, wrote RORA's notification provisions
in the present tense, and positioned RCRA to control toxic
substances before release.2 11 Thus, if the locus of the crime of
unlawful hazardous waste disposal is found in the past, the
client's crime may be analogized to the case of fraud in the
securities regulation context.212
Unlike fraud in the securities regulation context, how-
ever, hazardous substance laws are health, safety and public
welfare laws.213 The laws protect people from physical harm,
and depending on the circumstances, violation may be mala
in se. Moreover, as in the case of child abuse or nuisance, 214
if a client refuses to disclose an unlawful discharge after legal
counseling, the crime of not reporting and the dangers to in-
dividuals are likely to continue unabated. Therefore, the Bar
should interpret the Model Rules to permit reporting in a
few, but critical, fact specific situations.
209. See RCRA § 3002(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a)(5).
210. See RCRA § 1003, 42 U.S.C. § 6902. See Dickerson, Inc. v. United
States, 875 F.2d 1577, 1581 (11th Cir. 1989).
211. With regard to citizen suits under section 6972(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7002(a)(1)(B), RCRA reaches past conduct, 'but only to the extent that such
past conduct continues to produce a present endangerment." Murray v. Bath
Iron Works, Corp., 867 F.Supp. 33, 41 (D. Me. 1994).
212. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
213. See United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 416 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991) (cit-
ing United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666 (3d Cir. 1984)).
214. A release of hazardous materials typically does not constitute a continu-
ing trespass (i.e. failure to remove chattel from land) because the release "once
[and] for all produces] a permanent injury to the land." Graham Oil Co. v. BP
Oil Co., 885 F.Supp. 716, 726 (W.D. Penn. 1994)(quoting Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 161, cmt. (e)). However, if 'the nuisance continues unabated, a plain-
tiff may bring successive actions for damages throughout its continuance...
since the tort is ongoing." Murray, 867 F.Supp at 48.
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B. Reporting Under CERCLA
CERCLA's focus on remedial action differs from RCRA's
prospective mandate and mediates toward allowing disclo-
sure of a client's past dumping. CERCLA imposes an affirm-
ative and ongoing duty on corporate or natural persons to
report unauthorized releases of hazardous waste to appropri-
ate government authorities.2 15 Thus, a client's failure to dis-
close a release is a crime regardless of whether the crime is in
the past or present. On the other hand, the attorney's may
only disclose a client's crime if the effects of the crime are still
being felt or the crime itself has not been completed. 216
There, the attorney may evaluate whether the release is seri-
ous enough to mandate disclosure in the face of the duty to
maintain confidences.
C. Disclosure under CERCLA and the Special Problem of
Commingled Waste
The Model Code permits disclosure of a client's intent to
commit a crime, while the Model Rules allow disclosure only
if the crime is likely to "result! in harm to a third party.217
The distinction between the Model Code and the Model Rules
becomes particularly important when the client's hazardous
waste becomes commingled with that of others making iden-
tification difficult or impossible. Thus, the issue arises
whether the attorney should have discretion to report under
the Model Rules if a third party faces imminent death or seri-
ous bodily harm because of unlawful disposal that is not spe-
cifically attributable to the client corporation's waste. The
common law doctrine of joint and several liability218 and
court interpretation of CERCLA219 suggest that the answer
may be yes.
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,220 the California
Supreme Court adapted the classic joint and several liability
215. See RCRA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a).
216. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 126.
218. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
219. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988).
220. 607 P.2d 924, 931 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 912 (1980).
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/17
1996) BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON TOXIC CLIENT 261
case, Summers v. Tice,22 ' to the pharmaceutical context. The
Sindell court permitted women who had taken the birth con-
trol drug diethylstilbesterol (DES), which was subsequently
shown to cause cancer, to collect compensation, in whole,
from one of a substantial number of pharmaceutical corpora-
tions that had produced the drug.222
The court based its holding on a combination of equitable
and policy principles. First, the court recognized the underly-
ing equitable principle enunciated in Summers: "as between
an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter
should bear the cost of the injury."223 The court reasoned
that while there may not be sufficient evidence to show that
any one of the defendants directly caused the harm, the "[de-
fendant's] conduct in marketing a drug the effects of which
are delayed for many years played a significant role in creat-
ing the unavailability of proof."224 Thus, the court relaxed
the evidentiary standard necessary to show causation where
the harm has a long latency period and results from the pos-
sible combined action of independent parties.2 25
From a policy standpoint, Judge Calabresi has persua-
sively argued that "the principal function of accident law is to
reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of
avoiding accidents."226 By making each tortfeasor liable for
the total harm under the theory of joint and several liability,
individual decisionmakers are less likely to perform unper-
mitted or tortious acts.227 Hence, the Sindell court concluded
221. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
222. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.
223. Id at 936.
224. Id.
225. Similarly, in rejecting the defendant's (generator's) argument for appor-
tionment of damages based on volumetric contribution of hazardous waste, the
Monsanto court found that "(clommon sense counsels that a million gallons of
certain substances could be mixed together without significant consequences,
whereas a few pints of others improperly mixed could result in disastrous con-
sequences." Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172.
226. Gumo CALABREsr, THm CosTs OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOIC
ANALYsis 26 (1970) [hereinafter CALABREsi, CosTs].
227. It is worth noting that the expected costs and benefits from committing
the injurious act are the same, on average, whether a rule of joint and several
liability or that of proximate cause applies. However, as the 18th Century
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that because "[t]he manufacturer is in the best position to
discover and guard against defects in its products and to
warn of harmful effect..., holding the [company] liable...
will provide an incentive to product safety."228 Recognizing
the special vulnerability of lay consumers when dealing with
pharmaceuticals, the court emphasized that these considera-
tions are especially important when the harmed parties are
not in a good position to protect themselves. 22 9
Courts have similarly imported the joint and several lia-
bility common law theory in the context of CERCLA.230 In
United States v. Monsanto,231 the Ninth Circuit interpreted
section 107 of CERCLA232 as imposing joint and several lia-
bility on any waste generator or transporter, among others,
whose waste is similar in kind to that released or that could
have been produced by the mixture of the defendant's waste
with other waste present at the dump site.23 3 While the costs
of clean-up are apportionable, each identified responsible
party is liable for the whole.23 4 Reasoning in a manner analo-
Swiss mathematician Bernoulli noted, people balancing decisions under condi-
tions of uncertainty do not necessarily attempt to maximize expected quantifi-
able benefits. Instead, they may try to minimize unexpected large losses. This
observation introduces the decisionmaker's aversion or indifference to risk into
the equation. See CooTFr, supra note 38, at 254.
228. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
229. See generally, Jeffery Trauberman, Statutory Reform of Toxic Torts: Re-
lieving Legal, Scientific and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HAnv.
ENVTL. L. Rnv. 177, 260-261 (1983) (noting that in order to protect the harmed
party, the courts hold each defendant liable for a share of the damages).
230. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 287-300.
231. The Monsanto court imported joint and several liability theory from the
common law. The court reasoned that "Congress knew of the synergistic and
migratory capabilities of leaking chemical waste, and the technological in-
feasibility of tracing improperly disposed of wasted to its source... [We will
not frustrate the statute's goals by engrafting a proof of ownership requirement
." Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 170.
232. In the pertinent part, CERCLA §§ 107(a)(3),(4) impose liability on off-
site waste generators who "arranged for disposal ... of hazardous substances
... at any facility... containing such hazardous substances.. . " and any
transporter who "accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities... from which there is a release .... " 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9607(a)(3), (4).
233. See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171.
234. See id. at 172-73.
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gous to Sindell,235 the Monsanto court found that because it
is impossible to "'finger print' waste," imposing a "proof of
ownership requirement" would "eviscerate the statute."236
The analysis applied by the Monsanto court comports
with Judge Calabresi's tort policy rule: administrative costs
are minimized because expensive analysis required to appor-
tion costs need not be undertaken,23 7 and because both indi-
viduals and corporations are typically averse to sudden
accrual of liability,238 they are likely to take steps to ensure
proper treatment of their waste.
For similar reasons, the attorney for the client that has
unlawfully disposed of hazardous waste, but who will not re-
port, may have no way of knowing whether his client's chemi-
cals are those which will likely result in imminent death or
serious bodily harm. To hold the attorney to a level of cer-
tainty based on actual causation would, in all but the most
limited cases, prohibit disclosure and permit the harm to
occur.
However, there are those who would find highly restric-
tive disclosure acceptable. 239 At least two basic arguments
support a restrictive view of causation under Model Rule 1.6.
First, from a societal stand-point, the client who has unlaw-
fully disposed of hazardous waste needs legal assistance.
Without open discussion free from the potential threat of dis-
closure, the polluting client will not be able to come into com-
pliance and the public may well suffer the full weight of the
release's harm. 240
The second, and, perhaps, the more interesting argument
is based upon the policy that supports individual auton-
omy.2 4 ' In the administrative and judicial determination of
liability, Judge Calabresi's tort policy argument may favor
235. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 929.
236. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 170 (quoting United States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp.
1326, 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1983)).
237. CALABRESi, CosTs, supra note 226, at 135-73.
238. See supra note 227. See also CooTER, supra note 38, at 57-58.
239. See generally Freedman, supra note 130.
240. This is simply an application of the argument discussed supra notes
136-40 and accompanying text.
241. See Pepper, supra note 140, at 616-17.
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joint and several liability.242 However, many values support-
ing attorney-client confidentiality are somewhat different.
Judge Calabresi's rule does not consider the inherent value of
allowing an individual client to make his or her own decision,
a policy which, in part, underpins Model Rule 1.6.243 More-
over, to allow an attorney to report a de minimis responsible
party whose waste happens to have ended up in a large re-
lease site might seem unfair.
Nevertheless, Model Rule 1.6's causation requirement
suggests an interpretation consistent with the common law
theory of joint and several liability. First, just as the proxi-
mate cause standard does not make sense in the context of
the toxic tort,2 " it would fail in the context of Model Rule 1.6.
The possible long latency period, the near impossibility of ac-
curate tracing, and the great potential for widespread, irrepa-
rable harm to human health and the environment, suggest
that society may suffer gravely if notification is prohibited by
application of the proximate cause requirement.
While it is probably correct that if many attorneys dis-
close their clients' involvement with a site that posed immi-
nent death or substantial harm to the public, clients will not
seek legal assistance in the first place. On the other hand, if
the client has no intention of reporting, an attorney's contin-
ued remonstrations are unlikely to persuade the client any-
way. Moreover, the attorney who has reached the difficult
conclusion that disclosure is necessary will have balanced the
competing factors discussed above and determined that re-
monstration is useless and death or serious bodily harm will
likely result unless disclosure is made.
The second argument supporting the restrictive view of
disclosure has more superficial appeal than real merit. While
Calabresi's tort policy rule is less concerned with the individ-
ual's right to break the law, the acceptance of professional-
client confidentiality is a rule based on policy and not consti-
242. See generally, CALABRESI, CosTs, supra note 226.
243. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
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tutional principle.2 45 Moreover, far from being unconcerned
with individual autonomy, Judge Calabresi, a former Profes-
sor of Law and Economics, holds free choice in high regard.246
While his tort policy is compatible with the general rule
against disclosure, in its pure utilitarian form (to which Cala-
bresi would likely not subscribe) it does not extend so far as
to diminish the public's utility more than it would serve to
increase the client's.247
V. Conclusion
This Article has generally argued for broad but condi-
tioned attorney discretion in reporting a client's improper dis-
posal of hazardous waste when harm to human health is
likely. The unusual properties of toxic substances, the threat
of widespread harm to human health, and the potential for
prevention or mitigation offered by early disclosure are the
principle factors forming the argument. Moreover, the per-
ception of criminal environmental violation as a crime mala
in se further mediates toward permission to report.
The fact that an attorney may disclose, however, does not
imply that the attorney must disclose. Indeed, because attor-
ney-client confidentiality is vital to our system of law, the at-
245. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6 cmt. 4. The purpose of the Rule 1.6 is to
encourage clients "to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to
embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter." Id.
246. See Gumo CALABRESi, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATITUDES AND THE LAw: PRI-
VATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 11 (1985) [hereinafter CAL.
ABRESI, IDEALS].
247. Two points deserve additional attention. First, as discussed in the text
accompanying note 230, supra, on average, joint and several liability does not
change the expected value of the amount that the individual will have to pay.
Rather, the recovery theory will affect the timing of the payment. Second, Cala-
bresi's rule, as applied in the context of Rule 1.6, mediates towards maximizing
total individual autonomy, not just the autonomy of the client. Because depar-
ture from Calabresrs maximization rule would imply an economic inefficiency
(i.e. precautionary resources would be under-allocated by the polluter, and the
toxic impacted public would be forced to bear the costs, in effect subsidizing the
polluter) the autonomy of the total community of individuals would be dimin-
ished. Calabresi, however, would likely arrive at a slightly different answer, as
his calculus would factor in the value of society's belief in the ability of people to
make autonomous decisions. See CALABRESI, IDEALS, supra note 246, at 87-114.
39
266 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
torney must use substantial discretion in making the choice
to disclose.
To restate the hypothetical: In spite of attorney remon-
strations, a small, closely-held dry cleaning corporation re-
fuses to report to authorities that its waste hauling company
has been dumping the firm's hazardous waste into a gravel
quarry. While the volume contributed by the firm is small in
comparison to the total amount dumped, gravel beds fre-
quently drain directly into aquifers, indicating possible
threat of serious and widespread harm to human health.
The Model Code would permit disclosure on the basis of
CERCLA's affirmative and ongoing requirement that genera-
tors report releases. Under the Model Rules, however, the at-
torney, Anderson, would need more information before
determining whether he could permissibly disclose the
release.
Recognizing that the Model Rules require both that the
lawyer believe the harm "likely,"248 and that the disclosure is
"necessary" to prevent the harm,249 the lawyer must have a
strong understanding of the factual circumstances. Further,
given the importance of the ethical obligation, not only to the
dry cleaning business, but to the practice of law and the pub-
lic, generally, Anderson should seek more information before
making disclosure.
Like any attorney contemplating disclosure, at a mini-
mum, Anderson must satisfy himself that the exigency of the
circumstances meets the Model Rules' "likely" standard of
certainty. Without some kind of risk assessment, at least a
limited one, it is unclear how Anderson could disclose the re-
lease. The more serious the release, for example, highly toxic
waste released in proximity to a vulnerable human popula-
tion, the less detailed the study would need to be in order to
satisfy the certainty standard. Before disclosing, the attor-
ney should consider: (1) what vectors would lead people into
contact with the waste; (2) the type(s) of population(s) that
would likely encounter the waste; (3) the volume, toxicity,
248. See MODEL RumEs Rule 1.6 (b)(1).
249. See id.
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persistence, and likely synergistic interactions of the waste
with other substances; (4) the circumstances under which the
waste was released; (5) the date of the release; (6) the location
where the waste was released; and (7) whether any other
wastes were or are present at the site. These factors would
allow the attorney to make a reasoned, informed decision
whether to disclose.
Anderson, in the case at hand, or an experienced envi-
ronmental attorney, generally, should not have difficulty
gathering or analyzing the needed information. Indeed, in
counseling his client, Anderson should have obtained and
considered most of the above mentioned information anyway.
While cases undoubtedly exist in which releases occurred
without any record having been kept, if the volume and toxic-
ity of the waste can be determined, as well as the date of re-
lease, the attorney may be able to make some determination.
However, if little evidence exists of a release's severity, then
the circumstances are likely inappropriate for disclosure.
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